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The composite indicator \Quality of work" for comparing European countries is con-
structed from data of the Third European Survey on Working Conditions. The main
¯ndings are as follows: (a) European countries di®er with respect to working conditions
statistically more signi¯cantly than with respect to earnings; it implies a quite accurate
discrimination threshold in ranking countries with respect to quality of work, (b) working
conditions and earnings positively depend over the whole of Europe but little correlate
within single countries; it indicates at the prevailing role of national determinants over
professional or social speci¯cities as contributing to the average quality of work, (c) earn-
ings play no role in subjective satisfaction from work which exclusively depends on work-
ing conditions; consequently, more attention should be paid to improving the latter, (d)
working conditions of women are signi¯cantly better than that of men, which is explained
by their inclination to service occupations. Processing ordinal rather than metrical data
requires an addendum to the methodology of composite indicators. The corresponding
mathematical model is proposed.
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56In the new list an indicator quality of work has been
added in response to the emphasis put on this issue by the
Stockholm European Council. The particular indicator on
accidents at work has been chosen ::: But other indica-
tors of quality of work, such as \life-long learning", were
already included in the list of structural indicators.
European Communities




The concept of the European welfare state includes both economical and social aspects;
see Esping-Andersern (1990). Since employees spend at least 1/3 of the time at work,
more than devoted to family, friends, and leisure together (Esser and Schrader 1993, 2nd
cover page, Halama 1997, p. 2), working conditions play in the total welfare as important
role as income, consumption, or living standards.
Working conditions permanently remain in the focus of attention of the European
Commission, national governments, and trade unions. In particular, it is one of issues
of the European Employment Strategy (EES) launched in 1997 in Luxembourg. The
EU Lisbon Summit 2000 claimed for \ more and better jobs and greater social cohesion
by 2010". Four years later, on March 2004, the European Council again emphasized
\the urgency to take e®ective action in creating more and better jobs"; see European
Commission (2001{2004).
At the European level, the supervision of working conditions is institutionalized
in the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions,
Dublin, and the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, Bilbao. The former is
a European organization, one of the ¯rst to be established to work in specialized areas
of EU policy. It was set up by the European Council (Council Regulation EEC No.
1365/75 of 26 May 1975) and since then carries out research and development projects,
providing data and analysis for informing and supporting the formulation of EU policy.
The Foundation has a network of experts throughout Europe who conduct research on its
behalf including assessing the current national situations, the preparation of case studies
and national reports and the conducting of surveys; see European Foundation (2004).
The European Agency closely collaborates with the European Foundation. It acts
as a catalyst for developing, collecting, analyzing and disseminating information that
improves the state of occupational safety and health. The Agency is a tripartite Euro-
pean Union organization also set up by the European Council (Council Regulation EEC
No. 2062/94) to bring together representatives from three key decision-making groups in
each of the EUs Member States | governments, employers and workers associations; see
European Agency (2004)1.
1Germany has contributed to these European initiatives as early as in the 1970s by a research program
Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens (HdA) (= Humanization of Working Life) followed by programs Arbeit
und Technik (= Work and Techniques), and Innovative Arbeitsgestaltung (= Innovative Work Structur-
ing); see the Editorial to Arbeit, 2004/3. The actual program of this type, Initiative Neue QualitÄ at der
Arbeit (INQA) (= Initiative New Quality of Work), is complemented with the political initiative Gute
72 European surveys on working conditions
Both institutions use statistical data on working conditions collected by the EuroStat
(2004) which are available from the New Cronos Internet page (section Population and
Social Conditions). Selected data are annually summarized in the Labour Force Surveys
and other EuroStat reports, also available on-line. These data are however not enough
exhaustive for specialized studies on working conditions, and in 1990 the European Foun-
dation has originated purpose-oriented European Surveys on Working Conditions which
take place every ¯ve years, the third dating 2000 and the fourth being planned for 2005.
The most recent survey by the European Foundation (2000) is based on a ques-
tionnaire with over 200 questions related to
² occupation (position, industry branch, type of contract, size of enterprize, etc.),
² physical environment (vibrations, noise, painful positions, etc.),
² time (evening, weekend, and shift-work, schedule of working time, etc.),
² organizational issues (monotonicity of work, unforeseen tasks, independence and
subordination, etc.),
² social climate (possibility to discuss working conditions, cases of violence, discrimi-
nation, etc.),
² health (di®erent professional diseases, accidents, sick leaves, etc. ), and
² income (basic, bonus, sharing pro¯ts, compensations for overtime, etc.)
Totally, 21703 persons from 15 European countries are interviewed by national
institutes listed in p. 67 of the report. Each country is represented by ca. 1500 interviews,
except for Luxembourg with 502 interviews. The interviewed persons are selected by
the method of random walk, and the results are processed as in a microcensus. That
is, the European ¯gures are derived from the national averages accounted with weights
proportional to the size of active population in the given country according to the Labour
Force Survey of EuroStat (1997), ranging from 0.17 Mio in Luxembourg to 35.30 Mio in
Germany; see pp. 1{3 and 67{68 of the report.
Thus, the interviews are aggregated in the population dimension (= vertical di-
mension of the survey data). Thereby the report provides a comprehensive outlook at
single countries and the whole of Europe with respect to all the questionnaire items. For
instance, one can ¯nd the percentage of employees working with computers at least 1/4
of the time or all the time (p. 8), or the percentage of ¯xed-termed employees or even
trainees who dare to discuss their working conditions at their workplace (p. 26). It en-
ables tracing the evolution of the corresponding European and national indicators since
the ¯rst survey of 1990.
Arbeit (= Good Work) of the leading German trade union IG Metall; see Pickshaus and Urban (2004);
for the current German debate on the quality of work see Peters and Schmitthenner (2003).
83 The surveys from the viewpoint of the EU policy
goals
Contrary to the EU's aiming at \better jobs", the survey deals little with the `worse|
better' evaluation of working conditions. In some cases the evaluation follows from ques-
tions by default, like from the ones about disturbing factors (noise, vibration, etc.) but in
other cases it appears to be quite ambiguous. For instance, one can learn almost every-
thing about the variability of working hours and spontaneity of changes of the working
time (pp. 23{25), but nothing is said on whether time °exibility is desirable, or evening
work is voluntary, or overtime is fairly rewarded.
Neither countries, nor industrial branches are classi¯ed with respect to the quality
of work in general. They are not even discriminated with respect to any composite factor
like scheduling working time, physical environment, or social climate. It stems from the
lack of inter-question aggregation of interviews (= in the horizontal dimension of the
survey data) which could integrate answers to all or selected questions. For instance,
there are over 20 questions on professional diseases but no integral characterization of
health at work2.
Therefore, it is impossible to judge which countries o®er better working conditions,
or which social groups are privileged. If a young European asks himself \In which country
would I like to work?" the surveys mentioned will be of little help. Even an expert can have
di±culties in ¯nding the countries with most favorable/most critical working conditions,
being lost in the totality of hardly observable information.
4 Composite indicators
Composite indicators, or synthetic indices, are increasingly propagating during the last
decade. They appear in numerous world-wide documents (United Nations 2001{, Inter-
national Institute for Management Development 2000{, World Economic Forum 2002{,
OECD 2002{2004). On October 2001 the European Commission recommended to de-
velop composite indicators for certain purposes within the Structural Indicators Exercise
(European Commission 2001a) which was followed by the report (European Commission
2002b). As emphasized by the OECD (2003, p. 3),
Composite indicators are valued for their ability to integrate large amounts of
information into easily understood formats for a general audience::: Despite
their many de¯ciencies, composite indicators will continue to be developed
due to their usefulness:::
2Another survey-based dedicated report Working Time Preferences in Sixteen European Countries by
the European Foundation (2002) also suggests no horizontal aggregation of answers. At most the answers
on factual and preferable situations are compared. For instance, answers like \I work 19 hours a week
but would prefer to work 21 hours" are processed to obtain conclusions like \50% employees would prefer
to work fewer hours, 11% would like to work more, and the rest 38% are satis¯ed" (p. 43, Table 16).
The only occasional step towards horizontally aggregating interview answers is made in pp. 62{79,
and 158. The desired increment/decrement in working time is explained with a regression model in
variables 'managerial duties', 'blue/white collar', 'small child', etc. The regression coe±cients, specifying
substitution rates of the variables, allow to bind partial preferences together and thereby to horizontally
aggregate interview answers. Regretfully, this possibility is not elaborated and the model is only used for
¯nding most decisive preference factors.
9Composite indicators are highly appreciated in international comparisons, where
it is often required to surmount national particularities and to bring the consideration to
the common denominator. As noted by Munda and Nardo (2003, p. 2),
Composite indicators stem from the need to rank countries and benchmarking
their performance whenever a country does not perform strictly better than
another. Composite indicators are very common in ¯elds such as economic
and business statistics (e.g., the OECD Composite Leading Indicators) and
are used in a variety of policy domains such as industrial competitiveness, sus-
tainable development, quality of life assessment, globalization and innovation
(see Cox and others 1992, Huggins 2003, Wilson and Jones 2002, Guerard
2001, FÄ are et al. 1994, Lovell et al. 1995, Griliches 1990 and Saisana and
Tarantola 2002, among others)::: A general objective of most of these indica-
tors is the ranking of countries according to some aggregated dimensions (see
Cherchye 2001 and Kleinknecht 2002).
A composite indicator is de¯ned to be a weighted sum of several ¯rst-level indica-
tors which weights re°ect their substitution rates; see European Commission (2002c, p.
79), OECD (2003, p. 5), and Munda and Nardo (2003, p. 2). In other words, compos-
ite indicators are simplest utility functions considered in economics as long as since the
19th century (Jevons 1871, Menger 1871, Walras 1874); for a modern account see Keeney
and Rai®a (1976), or Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986). Speci¯c issues on the typology of
composite indicators, requirements for input data, principles of weight assignments, and
others are reviewed by Bossel (1999), Huggins (2002), and Saisana and Tarantola (2002).
Practical aspects of composite indicators are outlined in brief guides by the OECD (2002,
2003), Pastille (2002), and Sendzimir (2004).
The di®erence between composite indicators and utility functions is rather method-
ological. The latter are used to represent individual or social preferences. Composite
indicators re°ect development of and di®erences between objects; they however are also
often charged with a better/worse inclination. Another point is that several aspects of a
phenomenon are likely associated with composite indicators than with utility functions.
For instance, within the framework of working conditions, it is more natural to speak of
composite indicators for health and for social climate than of utility sub-functions. To
provide compatibility of scales, composite indicators are usually de¯ned in standardized
input variables. This is equally relevant to utility functions but only less emphasized.
Due to some fundamental di±culties of preference aggregation in multi-criteria
analysis (Arrow and Raynaud 1986), universal constructing methods exist neither for
utility functions, nor for composite indicators. In each case their construction is much
determined by the particular application, includes both formal and heuristic elements, and
incorporates some expert knowledge on the phenomenon; see proceedings of dedicated
conferences on constructing utility functions (Tangian and Gruber 1997; 2002) and on
composite indicators organized by the Joint Research Center of European Communities
and the OECD (Saltelli 2003a{b and Ho®mann 2004).
Taking into account both political claims for \better jobs" and modern trends,
the European Union needs composite indicators of working conditions to be used both
as analytical tools and as instruments for pursuing the European Employment Policy.
This need is explicitly expressed in some EU documents, like in the one cited in the
epigraph. Such indicators are most urgent in view of integrating new country members
which development should be adequately monitored.
105 Composite indicator \Quality of work" and main
¯ndings
The European surveys on working conditions signi¯cantly contribute to political goals of
the EU. However, they leave open the key question, how to summarize the totality of
the information and to compare countries with each other. The given study attempts to
¯ll in this gap by constructing a composite indicator \Quality of work" for 15 European
countries.
The source data are of the Third European Survey on Working Conditions available
from the European Foundation. The general approach follows the OECD (2003) guide-
lines for developing composite indicators of country performance. The evaluation model is
based on methods for practically constructing utility functions (Tangian 2002, 2004a) and,
more speci¯cally, on the author's experience in designing indices for equalizing German
regional labour market policy and for monitoring European °exicurity policies (Tangian
2003, 2004b). Mathematical model is described in Annex 1. The detailed composition of
the indicator is given in Annex 2.
The spatial location of countries with respect to three indicators \Working condi-
tions", \Hourly earnings", and \Subjective satisfaction", is shown in Figures 1 and 2. The
¯rst coordinate is the national average of working conditions. It is derived from answers
to 102 \non-subjective" questions of the survey. The second coordinate is the national
average of \Hourly earnings". It is derived from monthly earnings expressed in standard
harmonized units and hours actually worked. The third coordinate, \Subjective satis-
faction" is derived from answers to seven questions on subjective estimation of working
conditions. The third dimension is depicted by colors as the height of relief in geographic
maps and is shown spatially in Figure 2.
The best working conditions are in the Netherlands and Denmark which are right-
most in Figure 1. Greece at the left hand has the worst working conditions. Germany
is in the upper (= right-hand) third of the European range, being close to the United
Kingdom, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, and Italy. As one can see, German working
conditions are not as good as in Sweden and Austria but better than in France, Spain,
and Portugal. The di®erence between working conditions in West and East Germany is
insigni¯cant.
1. The dispersion of vectors of individual indices in Figure 1 around the national aver-
age is analyzed by the method of prime components (= factor analysis); see Jackson
(1988), Krzanowski (1988), and Seber (1984). The results are visualized by the el-
lipse which envelopes the vectors of prime components (= directions of maximal and
minimal variance) as diameters. The ellipse depicts the standard deviation from the
mean depending on the direction. Note that the variance of earnings is smallest in
Sweden and largest in Luxembourg and Ireland, whereas the national variance of
working conditions is almost equal over all European countries.
2. The ellipses in Figure 1 have no visible slope. It means that within countries
working conditions and earnings are little correlated. It is not the case
over the whole of Europe. The regression line ¯tted to the totality of individual
data (not countries!) exhibits a clear dependence between earnings and working
conditions: the better conditions, the higher earnings. Due to a large number of
observations (almost 17 000 respondents who provided income information), the
11Figure 1: Quality of work for European countries and West/East Germany (West Ger-
many and East Germany are indexed by W and E respectively); ellipses depict the devi-
ation of observations reduced to 0.02 of its size



























































































12Figure 2: Quality of work for European countries and West/East Germany (West Ger-
many and East Germany are indexed by W and E respectively)


















































Hourly earnings, harmonized 1−−4
Subjective satisfaction, in harmonized %
HrlErn =¡0:7988 +0:0441 ¤ WrkCnd R2 =0:0200 F = 343:0477 PF =0:0000
SbjSat= 8:4098 +1:0364 ¤ WrkCnd R2 =0:2288 F =4998:2832 PF =0:0000
SbjSat= 60:8384+0:4589 ¤ HrlErn R2 =0:0044 F = 73:9330 PF =0:0000
SbjSat= 8:4014 +1:0368 ¤ WrkCnd¡0:0104 ¤ HrlErn R2 =0:2288 F =2499:0246 PF =0:0000
13statistical signi¯cance of the null-hypothesis (= no dependence) is below 0.00005.
We conclude that this trend is rather inter-national, that is, the better national
working conditions, the higher national average earnings.
3. The much longer vertical extension of the ellipses means that in the European
space national hourly earnings are more dispersed than national working conditions3.
Consequently, European countries di®er with respect to working conditions
statistically more signi¯cantly than with respect to earnings. It does not
mean that the di®erences are larger but that the fact of di®erence is more certain.
It is quite unexpected in the background of globalization with expanding common
technologies, and in spite of European integration with intensive demographic °ows
and communications. It is likely caused by persistent di®erences in national norms,
in industrial traditions, and in labour movement activity. Therefore, equalization of
working conditions can become a goal of the European Employment Policy to meet
another European program on reducing disparities among countries and regions.
4. The regression plane in Figure 2 explains the indicator \Subjective satisfaction" as a
function in \Working conditions" and \Hourly earnings" (again, the computations
are performed for individuals but not for countries). The position of the plane
demonstrates that earnings play no role in the subjective satisfaction from
work and the only decisive are working conditions. This observation contributes to
recent discoveries of Canadian survey What's a Good Job? by Lowe and Schellenberg
(2001), that the absolutely predominating in appreciating the job are social factors,
in particular, relationships between colleagues; see also Lowe (2003).
The predominating role of social motivation for work, as opposed to economic mo-
tivation, manifested itself in extreme forms during certain historical periods. For
instance, Russian workers under Stalin were rewarded poorer than before the Revo-
lution of 1917 but were much more satis¯ed. From the standpoint of psychoanalysis,
money is a surrogate for the expression of love (Freud 1915, 1933); reformulating
this idea, wages compensate the lack of love in employment relations. Soviet work-
ers, having been assured that the state took care of them, were quite satis¯ed, and
many people remembered this period as the most happy.
Therefore, \adding more love" to employment relations by improving working con-
ditions can discharge the tension which apparently manifests itself through demands
for higher earnings. This idea goes in line with German political initiatives of the
1970s Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens (HdA) (= Humanization of Working Life);
see the Editorial to Arbeit, 2004/3. Consequently, it makes sense to invest in im-
proving working conditions even more than it might have seem necessary. This issue
should be put on the agenda of governments, employers, and worker's associations,
especially for the new EU member states.
5. Supplementary to the main goal of the study, the index \Quality of work" can be
used to make comparisons other than of countries. Annex 3 contains ¯gures anal-
ogous to Figures 1{2 but for social groups with respect to occupation, industry
branches (NACE classi¯cation), type of employment, type of contract, type of em-
ployer, size of the local unit, gender, and the gender of superior. The regression line
3The reference to the European space with standardized vertical{horizontal dispersion of counties is
important, otherwise, there would be no sense to compare axes measured in di®erent units.
14and plane are the same throughout all the ¯gures because they are ¯tted to indi-
vidual indices (which are the same) but not to group indices (which vary depending
on the classi¯cation).
In particular, it turns out that working conditions of women are signi¯cantly
better than that of men, which is explained by their inclination to service oc-
cupations. Moreover, employees with a female immediate superior have all
over Europe distinctly better working conditions than those with a male
boss.
6 Statistical signi¯cance of national di®erences
A number of statistical properties indicate at national di®erences in working conditions.
Therefore, the question emerges, how signi¯cant are disparities among the countries?
Table 1 shows the levels of statistical signi¯cance of null-hypotheses that pairs
of countries cannot be discriminated with respect to the index \Quality of work". The
headline of the table contains the number of respondents from each country. The table is
computed for the Behrens-Fischer t-test with possibly unequal variances which uses the
Satterthweite's approximation for the e®ective degrees of freedom (Milliken and Johnson
1992).
The signi¯cance levels in Table 3 are given in %. As traditional in social sciences
(KÄ uhnel and Krebs 2001, p. 404), a null hypotheses with signi¯cance < 5% (meaning
statistical unlikelihood), is rejected and its opposite is accepted. For instance, the element
1-2 of Table 3 is equal to 0. That is, the national means of Belgium and Denmark are
highly unlikely to coincide, consequently, they di®er in average working conditions. It
is not the case of Belgium and Germany. The null hypothesis that they have the same
working conditions is quite probable, having the signi¯cance 66%, and cannot be rejected.
Consequently, working conditions in Belgium and Germany do not di®er signi¯cantly, at
least for the given number of observations.
Testing hypotheses on pairs of countries is only the ¯rst step. When there are
many group means, there are also many pairs to compare. If one applies a statistical test
in this situation, the signi¯cance value is determined for each comparison disjointly. Then
the risk that one hypothesis of many is wrong grows as the number of pairs increases.
To resolve this problem, multiple comparison procedures are designed. They provide an
upper bound on the signi¯cance of the joint discrimination hypothesis for the totality of
pairs (Hochber and Tanhane 1987).
The results of the multiple comparison procedure for the joint signi¯cance level 5%
are depicted in Figure 3. For instance, Germany is shown by a blue segment centered at
the German national average. Countries do not signi¯cantly di®er from Germany jointly
if their segments are shaded by the German segment, ever if partially; these countries
are shown by grey color. Otherwise, the di®erence is jointly signi¯cant; these countries
are shown by red. Thus, Germany signi¯cantly di®ers jointly from Denmark, Greece,
Spain, France, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, and Finland. This list includes
no Italy and Austria, although disjointly Germany and Italy, and Germany and Austria
di®er signi¯cantly; see Table 1.
Figure 3 can be used for testing hypotheses on joint di®erence of other countries;
one should only imagine right colors and the shade from the interval of the country
selected. See Annex 3 for the application of this techniques to other situations.
15Table 1: Statistical signi¯cance of pairwise di®erence in working conditions for European
countries and West/East Germany (in %)
BE DK DE DEW DEE EL IT ES FR IR LU NL PT UK FI SE AT
1523 1506 1540 1173 367 1500 1500 1500 1502 1502 502 1516 1502 1514 1496 1574 1526
BE 0 66 88 41 0 3 0 0 41 37 0 0 0 0 21 0
DK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 85 0 0 0 0 0
DE 66 0 80 58 0 1 0 0 21 24 0 0 0 0 43 0
DEW 88 0 80 48 0 3 0 0 37 34 0 0 0 0 32 0
DEE 41 0 58 48 0 3 0 0 18 17 0 0 0 0 94 14
EL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT 3 0 1 3 3 0 0 0 18 60 0 0 22 0 0 0
ES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 0 0 0 0
IR 41 0 21 37 18 0 18 0 0 72 0 0 1 0 4 0
LU 37 0 24 34 17 0 60 0 0 72 0 0 18 1 9 0
NL 0 85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 1 18 0 0 9 0 0
FI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 9 0 0
SE 21 0 43 32 94 0 0 0 0 4 9 0 0 0 0 1
AT 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 Conclusions
1. The given study suggests a method for constructing a composite indicator \Quality
of work" for comparing European countries. The indicator is constructed from the
data of the Third European Survey on Working Conditions.
2. European countries di®er with respect to working conditions statistically more sig-
ni¯cantly than with respect to earnings. It implies a quite accurate discrimination
threshold in ranking countries with respect to quality of work.
3. Working conditions and earnings positively depend over the whole of Europe but
little correlate within single countries. It indicates at the prevailing role of national
determinants over professional or social speci¯cities as contributing to the average
quality of work.
4. Earnings play no role in subjective satisfaction from work which exclusively depends
on working conditions. Consequently, more attention should be paid to improving
the latter.
5. Working conditions of women are signi¯cantly better than that of men. It can be
explained by their inclination to service occupations.
6. Processing ordinal rather than metrical data requires an addendum to the method-
ology of composite indicators. The corresponding mathematical model is proposed.
16Figure 3: The 5%-signi¯cant joint di®erence in working conditions for European countries
and West/East Germany
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229 Annex 1: Rank-based composite indicators
Why composite indicators are weighted sums of variables A composite indicator
in the general form is a formula with n entries (for ¯rst-level indicators), in other words,
a function f in n variables which to each set of input values x1;:::;xn puts into cor-
respondence the indicator value y = f(x1;:::;xn). Usually a composite indicator is not
expected to abruptly change its behavior, meaning the di®erentiability of f. Then its Tay-
lor expansion in a neighborhood of some reference point (x0
1;:::;x0
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Since composite indicators are primarily designed for comparisons and tracing relative
progress, the constant C in (1) is omitted. The remaining weighted sum of variables is,
consequently, the general composite indicator to within its ¯rst-order approximation.
Apparent problems with rank-based composite indicators The input ¯rst-level
indicators are usually metrical (= measured in a cardinal scale). Ordinal ¯rst-level in-
dicators (= expressed in ranks) create certain problems discussed by the OECD (1999,
p. 115) in the context of composite indicator for the strictness of employment protection
legislation:
One limitation of a summary indicator based on ranking is that a given coun-
try's strictness score could either rise or fall over time, even though its em-
ployment protection practice were completely unchanged, for the simple reason
that other countries changed their policies. Even more fundamentally, it would
be invalid to compare rank-based score for the late 1980s, which was based
on an analysis of 16 European countries, with a rank-based score for the late
1990s based on a sample of 27 countries. Quite independently of any changes
in EPL, the maximum rank score has nearly doubled.
By these reasons the OECD replaced originally ordinal data by metrical expert
estimates. The method survived (OECD 2004), although the OECD itself acknowledges
that `the scoring algorithm is somewhat arbitrary' (Op. cit., p. 115).
Thus, the ¯rst anxiety is that rank-based indicators can make a country's score
dependent on changes in other countries. It is similar to what occurs in tournaments
when one's rating is altered by wins/losses of competitors. This phenomenon, known in
the theory of choice as the dependence of irrelevant alternatives, is not always critical;
for the historical discussion see Black (1958, pp. 156{238) and McLean and Urken (1994,
Introduction). In any case, the ranking method can be modi¯ed as follows.
23Method of Total Ranks To be speci¯c, consider Denmark (DK) and Netherlands
(NL) with regard to the duration of unemployment insurance in 1994{2004. In 1994
the duration of Danish insurance was 30 months, and in the Netherlands it was 6{54
months, depending on the length of service and age (Schmid and Reissert 1996, p. 239{
241). In 2004 Denmark extended the duration unconditionally to 48 months (European
Commission 2004). Although the duration of Dutch insurance remained unchanged, the
Netherlands fall in the two successive rankings:
Rank 1994 2004
Country Insurance duration Country Insurance duration
1 NL 6{54 months, conditioned DK 48 months, unconditioned
2 DK 30 months, unconditioned NL 6{54 months, conditioned
Now rank all the pairs Country/Year. For this purpose consider Denmark in 1994
and Denmark in 2004 as two di®erent objects (as they actually are) and the Netherlands
in 1994 and in 2004 as two copies of the same object. Hence, the total ranking is
RankCountryYear Insurance duration
1 DK 200448 months, unconditioned
2 NL 1994 6{54 months, conditioned
2 NL 2004 6{54 months, conditioned
3 DK 199430 months, unconditioned
which implies the constant rank of the Netherlands and changing ranks of Denmark:
Rank 1994 2004
Country Insurance duration Country Insurance duration
1 DK 48 months, unconditioned
2 NL 6{54 months, conditioned NL 6{54 months, conditioned
3 DK 30 months, unconditioned
Thus ranks can be made independent of `irrelevant alternatives'.
Accuracy of a rank-based composite indicator The second `more fundamental'
anxiety of the OECD is that the ¯rst-level indicators based on ranks are invalid when
the number of countries changes (e.g. the top rank of 27 countries almost doubles the top
rank of 16 countries). This problem can be resolved by proportionally reducing all the
ranks to the standard scale 0{1. The rigorous normalizing rules as well as the estimation
of error from substituting ordinal ranks for cardinal scores are given below.
Consider ranks as manifestations of continuous evaluations which are not observed
directly. Consequently, if one de¯nes an indicator as a weighted sum of partial scores and
disposes but partial ranks, it is natural to substitute the ranks for the scores.
This idea goes back to the justi¯cation of Borda's (1733{1799) method of marks
by Laplace (1749{1827); for the modern account see Black (1958), Tangian (1991), and
McLane and Urken (1994). Recall that Borda proposed to evaluate candidates to the
members of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris by the sum of their ranks in the
ballot schedules. Laplace assumed that these ranks were manifestations of some n latent
metrical estimates (scores) uniformly distributed in the segment [0;1]. He showed that
the ratio of expectations of the scores was as that of their ranks
¹1 : ¹2 : ::: : ¹n = 1 : 2 : ::: : n :
24By the Central Limit Theorem (the ¯rst version is attributed to Moivre (1667{1754); see
Kendall and Stuart 1958, Korn and Korn 1968) a sum of a large number of metrical scores
is well approximated by the sum of their expectations, or ranks. Laplace concluded that
in a large statistical model scores could be replaced by ranks with a negligible error.
This way of thought can be implemented already for a few metrical estimates
(scores) under a controllable accuracy of approximation. The next theorem suggests a
normalizing rule for the input ranks (di®ering from the standardization of metrical input)
and estimates the errors of the composite indicator which result from `ordinal rounding'
of its continuous entries.
Theorem 1 (Accuracy of a rank-based composite indicator)
Let given options be independently ranked with respect to ¯rst-level partial criteria k =
1;:::;K, each time falling into Rk ranking classes, depending on the criterion k. For each
partial criterion, the ranks are ordinal manifestations of unknown scores of continuous
¯rst-level indicators x1;:::;xRk which are random variables uniformly distributed in the
segment [0;1] (in statistics, if a distribution is not known it is assumed uniform by default).
Consider a composite indicator (weighted sum of ¯rst-level indicators with weights ak) both













ak = 1; ak ¸ 0 ; (2)
where xrk is the rkth score from the bottom in the set of the scores of the kth ¯rst-level
indicator. Then the error from `ordinal rounding' ¢ = I ¡ ~ I has the expectation and the
variance, respectively,
¹ = E¢ = 0
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Proof. Fix the kth criterion. As shown by Kendall and Moran (1963), the rkth ordered





rk(Rk ¡ rk + 1)
(Rk + 1)2(Rk + 2)
:
Hence, taking into account that I is constant regardless of values xrk









akExrk = 0 :
By the independence of estimation with respect to di®erent criteria, the variance of the
sum of scores is equal to the sum of their variances. We obtain
¾
2 = V¢
= VI + V ~ I
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25Independence of answers to interview questions To apply Theorem 1 verify the
independence of answers to questions k. Compute the correlation between pairs of vari-
ables constituted by answers to questions i;j throughout all the countries. (Each variable
is thereby a 21703-vector.) We have 1022 = 10404 pairs i;j: The histogram of the correla-
tion in Figure 4 demonstrates a rather low overall correlation between answers to di®erent
questions (pairs i;i with correlation 1 at the right-hand of the histogram should be ig-
nored). A few cases of medium correlation are collected in Table 2. As one can see, the
overall correlation is not much high. Theorem 1 can be applied with certain reservations,
implying that the factual inaccuracy of the composite indicator is somewhat greater than
the theoretical estimate (3) which lacks cross-correlation terms.
Computation of the composite indicator \Quality of work" The answer of re-
spondent n = 1;:::;21703 to question k = 1;:::;102 is coded as rank 1 · rnk · Rk,
where Rk is the maximal rank allowed by the kth question. If necessary, rankings are
inverted to Rk +1¡rk to standardize the direction of preference. Then the composite in-



















Weights in multi-individual-multi-criteria problems Equal weights are assumed
by the following reasons. First, it is known that a cybernetical system tends to distribute
its resources proportionally to the amount and importance of the incoming information
(Kohonen 2001). For instance, Eskimos use 10 notions for di®erent kinds of snow, whereas
Germans su±ce only one. Adapting the number of cells to the size, frequency, or impor-
tance of tasks is widely used in neuronal networks. In application to sections of the
interview \Physical environment", \Health", etc., this principle can be understood as
`the more important topic, the more questions'. For instance, over 20 interview questions
on health can be regarded as re°ecting the actual role of health in working conditions.
Second, if no information is available, it is traditional to assume the equiprobable
distribution, which also meets the principle of maximal likelihood; see Kendall and Moran
(1963). Within sections of the interview like \Health", it implies that under no other
information the questions should be equally weighted. Or should we give more weight to
\Hearing problems" than to \Sleeping problems"?
Since thematic sections of the interview are weighted proportionally to the number
of their questions, and within sections their questions are equally weighted, all questions
get ¯nally equal weights. If necessary, weights can be certainly adjusted. However, taking
into account their large number (102), one can expect that weighting errors statistically
annihilate each other and that the equally-weighted composite indicator provides a rea-
sonable approximation.
It should be also emphasized that weighting questions (criteria) in multivariate
problems is similar to weighting individuals in democracy. In large collectives, individuals
are often considered with equal weights regardless of education, experience, or intelligence.
26Figure 4: Histogram of paired correlation between variables i;j = 1 : 102 of the survey












































Table 2: Most correlated variables i;j in the survey (for ½ij · ¡0:40 and ½ij ¸ 0:40; i < j)
Variable i Variable j Correlation Variable i Variable j Correlation
Q2405 Q2406 ¡0:4080 Q21B1 Q21B2 0:4853
Q12A Q35C05 0:4027 Q11B Q11E 0:4884
Q35C05 Q35C09 0:4028 Q16D Q16C 0:4909
Q35C04 Q35C17 0:4038 Q35C05 Q35C08 0:4927
Q11C Q11E 0:4095 Q2501 Q2503 0:4985
Q3102 Q3103 0:4165 Q35C08 Q35C09 0:5109
Q3204 Q3210 0:4192 Q3204 Q3205 0:5123
Q16B Q16D 0:4251 Q14 Q16E 0:5142
Q11B Q11C 0:4274 Q3102 Q3202 0:5163
Q3209 Q3210 0:4312 Q12A Q12B 0:5163
Q16B Q16C 0:4329 Q2502 Q2503 0:5350
Q3104 Q3204 0:4331 Q3202 Q3203 0:5389
Q16B Q16E 0:4348 Q11E Q11F 0:5609
Q3101 Q3201 0:4354 Q3103 Q3203 0:5679
Q16A Q16C 0:4425 Q35C09 Q35C10 0:5773
Q11C Q11D 0:4472 Q11A Q11B 0:5871
Q27B1 Q27B2 0:4548 Q2501 Q2502 0:6060
Q11A Q11E 0:4622 Q3107 Q3108 0:6707
Q12A Q12C 0:4650 Q3207 Q3208 0:7677
Q3106 Q3206 0:4796 Q30A1 Q30A2 0:7794
Q3105 Q3205 0:4822 EF2004 EF2005 0:7989
27Any deviation from equal weights is a source of debate. To avoid it, equal weights are
accepted whenever possible. The main reason is the lack of alternative arguments.
In multi-criteria decision making there is no tradition to assign equal weights by
default. However, multiple criteria within a choice problem are similar to individuals
within a collective. Indeed, each criterion has its `own opinion' and `votes' for or against
given options. If criteria are few, they are likely unequal (as well as in case of a few
individuals). In case of a large number of criteria, the situation becomes so unclear that
equal weights can be the best solution.
Multi-individual-multi-criteria problems like ours are even more obscure. It should
be taken into account that each individual has his/her own criterion ratio. For instance,
a young women with a small child pays the prime attention to time factors, a middle-
aged man is most interested in carrier prospects, and a handicap worker is dependent on
physical factors. Therefore, assigning a higher weight to carrier prospects we favor the
middle-aged man and discriminate both the woman and the handicap.
Generally speaking, higher weights of certain criteria are advantageous for those
who are most interested in them and disadvantageous for those who are not. Thereby
unequal criteria weights implicitly result in a factual inequality of individuals. Therefore,
the problem of weighting criteria is closely linked to the one of weighting individuals. If
the individual weights are equal, the criteria weights should be likely equal as well.
Accuracy of the composite indicator \Quality of work" Estimate the standard
error of the composite indicator \Quality of work" for each country C as follows:
² Find the variance of the composite indicator ¾2
























² Assume the independence of respondents. Recall that the variance of a sum of
independent random variables is the sum of their variances. Hence, the standard
error of the composite indicator for country C is as follows
¾C =












Due to a large number of respondents (about 1500 in every country), the standard
error is under 0.07% of the composite indicator for all European countries, except for
Luxembourg (0.11%) which is represented by three times fewer interviews. This is the
standard deviation of the composite indicator based on \ordinally rounded" ¯rst-level
indicators from the same composite indicator based on some unknown `true' cardinal
¯rst-level indicators. The standard error for each country is speci¯ed in the last section
of Table 3 in Annex 2.
Composite indicator \Subjective satisfaction from work" The composite indi-
cator \Subjective satisfaction from work" is constructed absolutely in the same way. It
is based on seven questions of the interview in the next to last section of Table 3 from
Annex 2.
2810 Annex 2: Composition of the indicator \Quality
of Work"
The composition of the indicator \Quality of work" is displayed in Table 3. The columns
of the table correspond to 109 questions selected from the Third European Survey on
Working Conditions 2000. The labels (Q11A, Q11B, etc.), grouping into thematic sections
(Physical environment, Health, etc.), and coding conventions are speci¯ed in the table
head. With minor exceptions, they follow European Foundation (2001, pp. 45{62).
Rows of the table correspond to countries and contain cells with three numbers.
The top number is the code of the national average answer to the given question. For
instance, 6.12 in the top left cell means that the average Belgian almost never experiences
vibrations. The average Dane with the answer code 6.38 experiences vibrations the least,
which is re°ected by the rank 1 as the third element of the cell. The second number
in the cell, 76.50 for the Belgian and 79.73 for the Dane, is the harmonized score of the
average answer given in % (that is, converted to the 0{100% scale in the way to attain the
maximal statistical likelihood and if necessary inverted to re°ect the preference direction;
see Annex 1 for details).
The three columns from the last section, \Summary indicators", are used for mon-
itoring and analytical purposes. The ¯rst summary indicator, \Score of working con-
ditions", is the national average score derived from all the columns but of the section
\Subjective estimations". The cells in this column contain the national average score (=
the composite indicator of working conditions), the estimate of its standard error in %
which speci¯es the indicator accuracy (see Annex 1), and the rank of the country.
The next column, \Hourly earnings", is the national average given in harmonized
units ranging 1{4. It should be noted that 22.4% of respondents provided no data on their
income. These respondents are omitted while explaining subjective satisfaction from work
in working conditions and earnings. The number of retained respondents for each country
is indicated in parentheses.
Composition of the indicator \Subjective satisfaction from work" The last col-
umn of the table is the average of the section \Subjective estimations". This composite
indicator is used to characterize the subjective satisfaction from work/working conditions.
The layout of the last column is similar to that of the column \Score of working condi-
tions". It also contains national average, the standard error of the indicator estimate, and
the country rank.
29Table 3: Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and West/East






























































































































































































































































30Table 3: Sheet A. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and































































































































































































































































31Table 3: Sheet B. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and




































































































































































































































32Table 3: Sheet C. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and







































































































































































































































33Table 3: Sheet D. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and



































































































































































































































34Table 3: Sheet E. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and


































































































































































































































35Table 3: Sheet F. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and































































































































































































































































36Table 3: Sheet G. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and

































6: > 20 p.month
1: no




6: > 20 p.month
1: no
2: 1 per month
3: 2 per month
4: 3 per month
5: >3 p.month
1: no
2: 1 per month
3: 2 per month














































































































































































































37Table 3: Sheet H. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and
West/East Germany and their scores in harmonized % / ranks

























2: 1 day in advance
3: 2{3 days i.adv.
4: 4{7 days i.adv.
5: 8{14 days i.adv.
6: 15{30 days i.adv.
7: >30 days i.adv.
1: every 5 sec
2: every 30 sec
3: every min
4: every 5 min






















































































































































































































38Table 3: Sheet I. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and
















































































































































































































































39Table 3: Sheet J. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and























1: several a day
2: a few in a day
3: several a week




















































































































































































































40Table 3: Sheet K. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and







































































































































































































































41Table 3: Sheet L. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and








































































































































































































































42Table 3: Sheet M. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and













































































































































































































































43Table 3: Sheet N. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and


















































































































































































































































44Table 3: Sheet O. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and






















































































































































































































































45Table 3: Sheet P. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and















































































































































































































































46Table 3: Sheet Q. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and





















































































































































































































































47Table 3: Sheet R. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and
West/East Germany and their scores in harmonized % / ranks


























































































































































































































































48Table 3: Sheet S. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and



























































































































































































































































49Table 3: Sheet T. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and
West/East Germany and their scores in harmonized % / ranks
















































































































































































































































50Table 3: Sheet U. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and










































































































































































































51Table 3: Sheet V. Average indicators of quality of work for European countries and

















Belgium 51.64§0.06 / 7 1.40 / 13 61.64§0.26 / 11
DK (1377)
Denmark 52.62§0.06 / 2 1.51 / 5 64.96§0.22 / 1
DE (1103)
Germany 51.53§0.06 / 8 1.41 / 11 62.15§0.25 / 8
DEW (823)
West Germany 51.46§0.07 / 9 1.48 / 7 62.22§0.29 / 7
DEE (280)
East Germany 51.71§0.12 / 6 1.19 / 17 61.96§0.49 / 10
EL (1261)
Grece 48.65§0.06 / 17 1.50 / 6 57.36§0.23 / 17
IT (970)
Italy 51.28§0.07 / 11 1.58 / 4 60.12§0.26 / 14
ES (1023)
Spain 50.08§0.06 / 16 1.40 / 12 59.36§0.26 / 15
FR (1270)
France 50.55§0.06 / 14 1.39 / 14 60.50§0.23 / 13
IR (907)
Ireland 51.79§0.07 / 4 1.36 / 15 63.29§0.27 / 3
LU (344)
Luxemburg 51.39§0.11 / 10 1.63 / 1 61.09§0.44 / 12
NL (1356)
Netherlands 52.63§0.06 / 1 1.63 / 2 62.39§0.22 / 5
PT (1241)
Portugal 50.45§0.06 / 15 1.41 / 10 58.69§0.23 / 16
UK (1040)
United Kingdom 51.27§0.06 / 12 1.42 / 9 62.40§0.25 / 4
FI (1433)
Finland 51.01§0.05 / 13 1.44 / 8 62.15§0.22 / 9
SE (1425)
Sweden 51.73§0.05 / 5 1.60 / 3 62.37§0.22 / 6
AT (1079)
Austria 51.91§0.06 / 3 1.24 / 16 63.56§0.25 / 2
5211 Annex 3: Working conditions of selected social
groups
53Figure 5: Quality of work for occupation in EU-15 and Germany (indexed by G): L|
Legislators and senior o±cials and managers, P|Professionals, T|Technicians, C|
Clerks, S|Service/shop/market workers, A|skilled Agricultural and ¯shery workers,
W|craft and related trades Workers, O|Operators of plants and machines and assem-
blers, E|Elementary occupations, M|Military and armed forces in European countries
and in Germany (indexed by G); ellipses depict the deviation of observations reduced to
0.02 of its size






























































































54Figure 6: The 5%-signi¯cant joint di®erence in working conditions for occupation in EU-
15 and Germany (indexed by G): L|Legislators and senior o±cials and managers, P|
Professionals, T|Technicians, C|Clerks, S|Service/shop/market workers, A|skilled
Agricultural and ¯shery workers, W|craft and related trades Workers, O|Operators
of plants and machines and assemblers, E|Elementary occupations, M|Military and
armed forces





















14 groups have means significantly different from P
55Figure 7: Quality of work for economic activities (NACE) in EU-15 and Germany (indexed
by G): A+B|Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and ¯shing, C|Mining and quarrying, D|
Manufacturing, E|Electricity, gas and water supply, F|Construction, G|Wholesale
and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and household goods, H|Hotels and resaurants,
I|Transport, storage and communication, J|Financial intermediation, K|Real estate,
renting and business activities, L|Public administration and defence; compulsory so-
cial security, M|Education, N|Health and social work, O|Other community, social
and personal service activities, P+Q|Private households with employed persons; extra-
territorial organizations in European countries and in Germany (indexed by G); ellipses
depict the deviation of observations reduced to 0.02 of its size







































































































56Figure 8: The 5%-signi¯cant joint di®erence in working conditions for economic activities
(NACE) in EU-15 and Germany (indexed by G): A+B|Agriculture, hunting, forestry,
and ¯shing, C|Mining and quarrying, D|Manufacturing, E|Electricity, gas and water
supply, F|Construction, G|Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and
household goods, H|Hotels and resaurants, I|Transport, storage and communication,
J|Financial intermediation, K|Real estate, renting and business activities, L|Public
administration and defence; compulsory social security, M|Education, N|Health and
social work, O|Other community, social and personal service activities, P+Q|Private
households with employed persons; extra-territorial organizations































16 groups have means significantly different from L
57Figure 9: Quality of work for S|Self-employed and E|Employees in EU-15, Germany,
West Germany, and East Germany in Germany, West Germany, East Germany, and EU-
15 (indexed respectively by G, W, E, and no indexed); ellipses depict the deviation of
observations reduced to 0.02 of its size













































































58Figure 10: The 5%-signi¯cant joint di®erence in working conditions for S|Self-employed
and E|Employees in EU-15, Germany, West Germany, and East Germany









The means of groups E
W and S are significantly different
59Figure 11: Quality of work for P|Permanently employed, F|Fixed-term employed in
EU-15, Germany, West Germany, and East Germany A|temporary employment Agency
workers, and T|Trainees in Germany, West Germany, East Germany, and EU-15 (in-
dexed respectively by G, W, E, and no indexed); ellipses depict the deviation of observa-
tions reduced to 0.02 of its size





































































































60Figure 12: The 5%-signi¯cant joint di®erence in working conditions for P|Permanently
employed, F|Fixed-term employed in EU-15, Germany, West Germany, and East Ger-
many A|temporary employment Agency workers, and T|Trainees

















The means of groups F
W and A are significantly different
61Figure 13: Quality of work for P|Part-timers and F|Full-timers in EU-15, Germany,
West Germany, and East Germany in Germany, West Germany, East Germany, and EU-
15 (indexed respectively by G, W, E, and no indexed); ellipses depict the deviation of
observations reduced to 0.02 of its size











































































62Figure 14: The 5%-signi¯cant joint di®erence in working conditions for P|Part-timers
and F|Full-timers in EU-15, Germany, West Germany, and East Germany









4 groups have means significantly different from F
W
63Figure 15: Quality of work for size of local unit in EU-15 and Germany: 1|one employee,
2|2-4 employees, 5|5-9 employees, 10|10-49 employees, 50|50-99 employees, 100|
100-249 employees, 250|250-499 employees, 500|500 and over in European countries
and in Germany (indexed by G); ellipses depict the deviation of observations reduced to
0.02 of its size





















































































64Figure 16: The 5%-signi¯cant joint di®erence in working conditions for size of local unit
in EU-15 and Germany: 1|one employee, 2|2-4 employees, 5|5-9 employees, 10|10-
49 employees, 50|50-99 employees, 100|100-249 employees, 250|250-499 employees,
500|500 and over

















No groups have means significantly different from 100
G
65Figure 17: Quality of work for G|employed of national or Governmental services, S|
State-owned companies, P|Private companies, and O|Others in EU-15, Germany, West
Germany, and East Germany in Germany, West Germany, East Germany, and EU-15
(indexed respectively by G, W, E, and no indexed); ellipses depict the deviation of obser-
vations reduced to 0.02 of its size






















































































66Figure 18: The 5%-signi¯cant joint di®erence in working conditions for G|employed of
national or Governmental services, S|State-owned companies, P|Private companies,
and O|Others in EU-15, Germany, West Germany, and East Germany

















5 groups have means significantly different from G
W
67Figure 19: Quality of work for m|male employees and f|female employees in EU-15,
Germany, West Germany, and East Germany in Germany, West Germany, East Germany,
and EU-15 (indexed respectively by G, W, E, and no indexed); ellipses depict the deviation
of observations reduced to 0.02 of its size










































































68Figure 20: The 5%-signi¯cant joint di®erence in working conditions for m|male employ-
ees and f|female employees in EU-15, Germany, West Germany, and East Germany









4 groups have means significantly different from m
W
69Figure 21: Quality of work for M|Male or F|female immediate boss in Germany, West
Germany, East Germany, and EU-15 (indexed respectively by G, W, E, and no indexed);
ellipses depict the deviation of observations reduced to 0.02 of its size










































































70Figure 22: The 5%-signi¯cant joint di®erence in working conditions for M|Male or F|
female immediate boss









4 groups have means significantly different from F
W
71Figure 23: Quality of work for mF|male employees with Male boss, mF|male employees
with Female boss, fM|female employees with Male boss, fF|female employees with
Female boss in EU-15, Germany, West Germany, and East Germany in Germany, West
Germany, East Germany, and EU-15 (indexed respectively by G, W, E, and no indexed);
ellipses depict the deviation of observations reduced to 0.02 of its size


















































































72Figure 24: The 5%-signi¯cant joint di®erence in working conditions for mF|male employ-
ees with Male boss, mF|male employees with Female boss, fM|female employees with
Male boss, fF|female employees with Female boss in EU-15, Germany, West Germany,
and East Germany

















4 groups have means significantly different from mF
W
73